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Abstract-As a result of the growing popularity of
wireless networks, in particular ad hoc networks, se-
curity over such networks has become very important.
In this paper, we study the problem of secure group
communications (SGC) and key management over ad
hoc networks. We identify the key features of any
SGC protocol for such networks. We also propose an
efficient key agreement scheme for SGC. The scheme
solves two important problems that exist in most
current SGC schemes: requirement of member serial-
ization and existence of a central entity. Besides this,
the protocol also has many highly desirable properties
such as contributory and efficient computation of
group key, uniform work load for all the members,
few rounds of rekeying (2 rounds for the initial key
formation and join and 1 round for leave), and efficient
support for high dynamics. These properties make the
protocol well suited for wireless ad hoc networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks, in particular IEEE 802.11 networks,
have revolutionized the field of data networking with ap-
plications in numerous fields such as business, home and
military. Security of information over such networks are
of paramount importance. In wired networks, security ser-
vices such as authentication, key management and autho-
rization are generally provided by a trusted central author-
ity. In an ad hoc environment since the services of such
a central authority are not usually available, the members
have to provide such services themselves.
Trust establishment, key management and authorization
are important areas that need to be thoroughly researched
before security in wireless ad hoc networks becomes a re-
ality. In this paper, we study the problem of key manage-
ment and secure group communications over ad hoc net-
works. We consider a scenario where a number of mobile
nodes form an ad hoc network with no prior knowledge or
information.
Secure group communication (SGC) is defined as the
process by which members in a group can securely commu-
nicate with each other and the information being shared
is inaccessible to anybody outside the group. In such a
scenario, a group key is established among all the partic-
ipating members and this key is used to encrypt all the
messages destined to the group. A good SGC protocol
should efficiently manage the group key when members join
and leave; this is especially true in ad hoc networks where
the members are highly mobile and the network topology
is dynamic. Recently, a number of protocols have been
proposed to handle SGC over wireless networks but none
of these protocols efficiently handle the unique problems
posed by ad hoc networks. In this paper, we analyze such
ad hoc network features which are relevant for SGC appli-
cations and propose a new protocol that is suited for ad
hoc networks.
The new protocol has many desirable features with re-
gard to ad hoc networks. It does not require member se-
rialization or structure, supports a high level of user dy-
namics (member(s) join/leave), assumes no pre-shared in-
formation or the presence of a trusted authority. Moreover,
computation is equally distributed among all the members
and it is efficient in communication. In any SGC scheme,
recomputing the group key after member leave operations
is a difficult problem. The proposed scheme handles this
situation very efficiently since it requires only 1 round of
broadcast to recompute the group key after a member leave
operation.
The rest of this paper first discusses the desired SGC
properties over ad hoc networks in Section 2. Section 3
describes the related work on SGC schemes for wireless
networks. Section 4 describes the new protocols for SGC
over ad hoc networks and comparison with other schemes is
presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
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II. DESIRED FEATURES OF AN SGC PROTOCOL OVER AD
HOC NETWORKS
Before formulating a scheme for secure group communica-
tions over ad hoc networks, the desired properties of any
SGC scheme over ad hoc networks need to be clearly iden-
tified.
Avoidance of Member Serialization - A number of
SGC schemes require group member serialization or se-
quencing. In such protocols, information is sent from one
node to another in a pre-defined sequence in order to create
the group key. In ad hoc networks with high node mobil-
ity, such serialization is not efficient since the sequence may
not correspond to the best geographic node placement and
may lead to increased communication cost.
Contributory Key Agreement - This is defined as a
key establishment protocol whose secret key is a function
of information contributed by all the participants in the
group, so that no member can predetermine the value of
the key. It is a method for negotiating a key value with-
out actually transferring the keys, even in encrypted form.
The best example for key agreement is the Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key exchange protocol [3]. Since the existence of ei-
ther a centralized trusted authority (TA), group controller
(GC) or a pre-shared secret among all the mobile nodes is
not assumed, the SGC scheme should be a key agreement
protocol. Also, using a contributory protocol ensures that
all the group members in the ad hoc network play an equal
role in the computation of the group key instead of a few
nodes doing the bulk of the work. This results in uniform
energy consumption at all nodes, which is significant in
wireless ad hoc nodes with limited power budget.
Efficiency - Any scheme for ad hoc networks should be
efficient in both computation and communication. Mobile
nodes are typically computation and memory constrained
devices with limited battery power.
Good user dynamics - This means that the SGC
scheme should be able to support member join/leave op-
erations efficiently. This is a very important feature in ad
hoc networks due to its highly dynamic topology and user
mobility.
III. RELATED WORK
Recently a number of protocols have been proposed to
solve the problem of key management over wireless ad
hoc networks. Key pre-distribution has been discussed in
[11, 2, 1]. Zhu et al. in [11] discuss a probabilistic key
sharing scheme in which an offline key server is used to
initialize all the nodes. A password based multi-party key
agreement scheme was proposed in [1] where all the nodes
are assumed to share a password. Basagni et al. in [2]
describe a secure ad hoc network in which all the nodes
share a group identification key stored in tamper-resistant
devices. Though all the above schemes perform efficiently,
they require that all the nodes have some pre-determined
knowledge. In ad hoc networks where mobile nodes do not
have the privilege of knowing other group members before-
hand, assumption of such a pre-shared secret is invalid.
The concept of mobile certificate authorities has been
discussed in [10, 6]. In such schemes, the responsibilities
of a CA is distributed among a set of wireless nodes. A
subset (threshold) of such CAs must be contacted to ob-
tain a valid certificate. Such schemes have several advan-
tages such as providing data integrity, authentication and
non-repudiation. The drawbacks of such schemes are: (a)
identifying nodes that perform the role of a CA, conse-
quently these nodes must spend more power; (b) constant
availability of a threshold of CAs in a mobile network; and
(c) the use of the computationally expensive Public Key
(PKI) encryption systems.
Public key certificates are also used in [5], where all the
nodes are assumed to maintain a local certificate repository
and a probabilistic method is used to achieve a certificate
chain between two nodes. This scheme requires that all
the nodes are preloaded with a set of certificates and it
is possible that two nodes in the ad hoc network do not
achieve a certificate chain. Also, the authors in [10, 6, 5]
do not address the distinct features of SGC such as group
key formation and member join/leave.
Key establishment using contributory key agreement
protocols are discussed in [4]. Anton et al. in [4] discuss
a number of such protocols previously used on wired net-
works and conclude that the CLIQUES [8] protocol suite
is best suited for ad hoc networks. Li et al. in [7] also use
the GDH.2 (Group Diffie Hellman) protocol, part of the
CLIQUES protocol suite, for key agreement over ad hoc
networks. GDH is an efficient protocol with good support
for member join and leave operations but it has some un-
favorable features with regard to ad hoc networks. Most
importantly, the GDH scheme requires that the members
be serialized or structured in order to compute the group.
Also, the last member in the group acts as a Group Con-
troller (GC). Consequently the GC does more computa-
tion than the other members in the group. Thus, in using
GDH for ad hoc networks deciding which member is going
to perform the operation of a GC is an important problem.
Finally, Yasinsac at al. in [9] present a key agreement
protocol using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange concept.
The main advantage of this protocol is that it does not in-
volve member serialization. On the downside, the protocol
does not efficiently support member join/leave operations
and the protocol also involves the services of a GC.
IV. CRTDH: A KEY AGREEMENT SCHEME FOR AD HOC
NETWORKS
In this section, we will discuss the details of our proposed
contributory key agreement protocol, Chinese Remainder
Theorem and Diffie-Hellman (CRTDH) based scheme for
secure group communications. The different steps of the
key establishment process and the join/leave operations
are discussed in detail.
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A. Key Agreement
In order to establish the group key, each member Ui1,
where i = 1, . . . , n should execute the following steps
• Step 1: Select the Diffie-Hellman (DH) private share
xi and compute the public share yi = gxi mod p. (g
and p are the generator and the prime modulo used
in the Diffie-Hellman computation. This information
is public and if the nodes do not share this, then an
initial broadcast round is needed.)
• Step 2: Broadcast the DH public share yi to all the
members in the group.
• Step 3: Receive the DH public share of all the other
members in the group and compute the DH key shared
with each of them
mij = yxij mod p
where j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n and j = i
• Step 4: Find the Least Common Multiple (LCM) of
all the DH keys calculated in Step 3 as lcmi.
• Step 5: Select a random ki, such that ki <
min(mij ,∀j), which will be its share of the group key.
Also select an arbitrary number D such that D = ki
and another numberDp such that the gcd(Dp, lcmi) =
1.
• Step 6: Solve the CRT
crti ≡ ki mod lcmi
crti ≡ DmodDp
and broadcast it to the group.
• Step 7: Receive the crt values from all the other mem-
bers in the group and calculate
kj = crtj modmij
for all j = i and compute the group key
GK = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ . . .⊕ kn
As can be seen from the above steps, the Chinese Re-
mainder Theorem is used to send each member’s key share
(disguised) to all the other members in the group. The
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is performed to derive the
modulo value in the CRT calculation.
To understand the details of the scheme, let us consider
a member U1 in a group of 4 members. The first two steps
of the protocol involve the generation and distribution of
the DH public share by each member in the group. U1
1The notation is only for naming purposes and does not represent
any order/serialization of members.
selects a DH private share x1 and computes its DH public
share y1 = gx1 mod p. U1 then broadcasts the DH public
share y1 to all the other members in the group.
In Step 3 of the protocol, all the mij values are gener-
ated, which are nothing but the DH keys shared between
U1 and the other members. U1 calculates three m values
m12,m13,m14 which are equal to yx12 , y
x1
3 , y
x1
4 respectively.
y2, y3, y4 are the DH public shares of members U2, U3, U4
broadcasted in Step 2. The three DH keys (m12,m13,m14)
generated by U1 are equal to m21,m31,m41 generated by
U2, U3, U4 respectively. U1 then calculates the LCM of the
DH keys m12,m13 and m14. This LCM value will be later
used for the CRT calculation in Step 6.
Step 5 of the protocol involves the generation of a ran-
dom key share k1 by U1. This k1 share has to be less than
all DH keys m1,m2 and m3 and the lcm1 value since we
want the other members to obtain k1 and not k1 (modmij)
or k1 (mod lcm1) respectively. In the next step, U1 gener-
ates an arbitrary number D and Dp which will be used
in solving the CRT. The Dp value should be selected such
that Dp and lcmi are co-primes, in order to solve the CRT.
Also, the number D should not be equal to k1, since if they
are, then the solution to the CRT will be equal to the group
key, k1.
After solving the CRT in Step 6, the solution is broad-
casted to the group in Step 7. U1 solves the CRT to obtain
crt1 and broadcasts it to the the group. U1 also receives
the CRT values crt2, crt3, crt4 from the other members in
the group. U1 can obtain k2, k3, k4 by performing the fol-
lowing operations.
k2 = crt2 (modm12)
k3 = crt3 (modm13)
k4 = crt4 (modm14)
The individual ki shares are then XOR-ed to obtain the
group key GK.
Similarly all the members in the group arrive at the same
group key, since the following holds
kj ≡ crtj modLCMj ≡ crtj modmij
Any member, such as Ui, receives the (broadcast) val-
ues crt1 from U1,. . . , crti−1 from Ui−1, crti+1 from Ui+1,
. . . , and crtn from Un. Ui can then compute k1,. . . ,ki−1,
ki+1,. . . and kn using m(i,1),. . . ,m(i,i−1), m(i,i+1), . . . and
m(i,n) respectively. Along with its own ki, Ui has all the
elements for computing the group key. As a result, all the
members will compute the same key.
B. Join Operation
The operations to be performed when a new member joins
a group are explained below. Let us assume the mem-
ber U5 wishes to join an existing group of four members
{U1, U2, U3, U4}.
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• Step 1: All the current members (U1, U2, U3, U4)
should compute the hash of the current key GK i.e.
h(GK). One of the existing (closest) member should
transmit this hash value h(GK) and all the DH public
shares y1, y2, y3, y4 to the new member U5.
• Step 2: U5 will execute the steps given in the previous
section and broadcast the CRT value crt5 along with
its public DH share y5.
• Step 3: Existing members can compute the DH key
they share with U5 and thereby calculate the k5 key
share selected by U5. The new group key GKnew is
computed by XORing the hash of the current key and
the key share of the newly joining member U5
GKnew = h(GK)⊕ k5
It is obvious from the above steps that only the newly
joining member does the bulk of the work. The existing
members only do minimal work in receiving the new key
share and XORing with the hash of the old group key.
This is a desired feature in ad hoc networks since there are
frequent group membership changes due to node mobility.
The hash of the old key is sent to the joining member
since it should receive the shares of the existing members
but also not be able to read the messages sent to the group
previously.
In case of multiple joins, all the joining members should
execute the above steps to contribute their share towards
the group key. The existing members then XOR all key
shares from the newly joining members to get the new
group key. This makes multiple joins very efficient since
existing members only perform XOR operations with all
the contributed key shares. Also, the join operation (sin-
gle/multiple) involves only two rounds of communication.
C. Leave Operation
The leave operation is similar to the join operation but
consists of only one round. Let us assume U2 is going to
leave the group. Then the following operations need to be
performed to recompute the group key.
• Step 1: Any one of the remaining members, say U1,
should redo the key agreement steps in Section 4.1
from Step 4, but this time U2 should be left out of
the computation. Member U1 should select a new key
share k1 and not include the DH key it shares with U2
in the LCM and CRT computations.
• Step 2: The other members receive the crt1 value from
U1 and calculate the new k1 value. The new group key
GKnew is computed as follows
GKnew = GK ⊕ k1
It should be noted that, when a member leaves the
group, one of the existing members does the major por-
tion of the work. During implementation, suitable meth-
ods should be used that distribute this responsibility to
other existing members when there are frequent leave op-
erations.
In case of multiple leaves, all the leaving members should
be left out of the computation as shown above. No extra
computation is needed since the protocol need not be re-
peated for each leaving member. Thus the CRTDH pro-
tocol efficiently supports leave operations and more im-
portantly multiple leave operations in a single round of
computation.
V. DISCUSSION
The protocol described in the previous section meets the
requirements specified in Section 2. The protocol does not
assume any pre-shared secret between the members and
does not require the services of a trusted authority or a
group controller. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange and
the Chinese Remainder Theorem are not very computa-
tionally intensive. The use of Elliptic curves for the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange will make the scheme more efficient.
Communication wise the scheme involves only two rounds
for initial key agreement and join operations and only one
round for leave operations.
More importantly for ad hoc networks, serialization or
ordering of group members and communication is not re-
quired for the proper execution of the protocol. Every node
in the ad hoc network is treated equally and has to per-
form the same amount of work to compute the group key.
It also efficiently supports single/multiple user join/leave
operations, which is an important factor in highly dynamic
environments such as ad hoc networks.
Regarding the security of the scheme, we do not give a
formal proof security in this paper but analyze the means
by which the scheme can be broken. In order for an at-
tacker to obtain the group key, knowledge of all individ-
ual key shares, ki selected by each member is necessary.
The key share ki can be obtained by using either: (i)
any of the DH shared key mij computed by a member
Ui or (ii) the LCMi, which in turn depends upon the
DH shared keys. Both these methods depend upon break-
ing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. The Diffie-
Hellman key exchange is a well studied problem in litera-
ture and depends upon the Discrete Logarithmic Problem
(DLP). So far, no efficient algorithms have been designed
to break the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
A comparison with other proposed key management
schemes for ad hoc networks is given in Table 1 2 . The
pre-shared schemes [11, 2, 1] are left out of the compar-
ison since they use a totally different approach than the
2A number of schemes have been proposed in the literature that
deal with security in ad hoc networks, but we only consider those
schemes that deal with secure group communications.
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Table 1: Comparison of Key Management schemes
Protocol CLIQUES(GDH.2) [8] Mobile CA [10, 6] Yasinsac [9] CRTDH
Rounds n 2 2 2
Total messages n n-1 n+1 2n
No Pre-Shared secret
√ √ √ √
No GC/CA × × × √
Uniform Work load × × × √
No Serialization × √ √ √
Key Agreement
√ × × √
High Dynamics × × × √
key establishment process in the other schemes and are
not applicable in ‘truly’ ad hoc networks. The Mobile CA
approaches in [10, 6] do not deal with group key gener-
ation as such, but they can be easily extended to do so.
Any member in the group can act as the Group Controller
(GC) and generate the group key, which is later sent to all
the other members by encrypting it with each member’s
public key. This requires a minimum of two rounds for
selecting the GC and distributing the group key.
As can be seen from the table all the schemes do not as-
sume the existence of a pre-shared secret among the mem-
bers. On the other hand, except for the proposed CRTDH
scheme all the other protocols need the services of a Group
Controller to distribute the key. Since the major work is
done by the GC, there is no uniform distribution of work
load among the members and the selection of a GC is also
an important issue.
With regard to the serialization of members, only the
GDH.2 protocol requires this feature. In this scheme in-
formation is sent from one node to another in a serial fash-
ion requiring n − 1 rounds and one last broadcast round.
The Mobile CA and the Yasinsac schemes do not require
serialization since they are not key agreement schemes by
definition. The two schemes use encryption algorithms in
order to send the group key from the GC to the other mem-
bers in the group. Hence, information need not be passed
in any order, only the encrypted group key is sent from the
GC to all the other members.
Also, due to the use of encryption, these schemes do
not efficiently support user join/leave operations. When a
member joins or leaves the group, n− 1 encryptions of the
new group key need to be performed. The GDH.2 protocol
efficiently supports single join/leave operations but not a
high level of dynamics. The proposed CRTDH scheme
on the other hand is a key agreement protocol without
member serialization and with efficient support for user
join/leave operations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of secure group com-
munications (SGC) and key management over wireless ad
hoc networks. After an analysis of the properties of SGC
and ad hoc networks, we have identified the ideal features
of an SGC scheme over ad hoc networks. Also, we have
proposed an efficient contributory key agreement proto-
col, CRTDH, which does not require member serialization.
When compared to other key management schemes for ad
hoc networks, the proposed scheme has several favorable
features that make it well suited for such networks. As fu-
ture work, we intend to work on a formal proof of security
and implement CRTDH and related schemes.
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